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effects of these on the levels of employment and unemployment have been extensively 
studied, but nothing is known empirically about their well-being implications. Using 
longitudinal data from the European Community Household Panel, the author conducts the 
first study of the link between both EPL and RTE and workers’ wellbeing. The results provide 
evidence that both permanent and temporary employees gain from reforms that ease 
restrictions on temporary employment but leave firing costs for permanent workers 




JEL Classification:  J28 
  





Andrea Salvatori  
Institute for Social & Economic Research 
University of Essex 
Colchester CO4 3SQ 
United Kingdom 
E-mail: asalva@essex.ac.uk   
 
                                                 
* I thank prof. Mark Stewart and prof. Andrew Oswald for many helpful discussions. Useful comments 
were also provided by participants in seminars at Warwick University, WPEG London seminar series, 
the 2006 Congress of Italian Labour Economists, CEPS/INSTEAD, Differdange, Luxembourg, 
international conference on “Policies for Happiness”, University of Siena, Italy. Access to the ECHP 
was obtained within an EPUNET visit at the ESRI, Dublin, Ireland and as an IRISS visitor at 
CEPS/INSTEAD, Differdange, Luxembourg. I also thank the Directorate for Employment, Labour and 
Social Affairs of the OECD for providing the time-series of the EPL indicator used in this paper. 
Financial support in the form of EST Marie Curie Fellowship from the European Union is gratefully 
acknowledged. The ECHP data can be purchased from Eurostat while computer programs used can 
be obtained from the author. 1 Introduction
In the last twenty years, several countries have eased restrictions on temporary employ-
ment while leaving ￿ring costs for permanent workers substantially unaltered. Freeman
(2005) provides a review of the papers studying the (ambiguous) e⁄ects of these reforms
on labour market performance, but nothing is known on their welfare consequences for
the employed. Yet, understanding the welfare implications of these regulations is neces-
sary to deal with the potential trade-o⁄ between providing protection that is valued by
workers and ensuring that future job creation is not undermined. This paper presents the
￿rst study of the e⁄ects on individual workers￿wellbeing of employment protection legis-
lation (EPL) for permanent workers and restrictions on the use of temporary employment
(RTE).
Because changes in labour contract regulations a⁄ect workers in potentially o⁄setting
ways, it is not possible to draw welfare implications simply on the basis of traditionally
observed variables. For example, changes in the degree of protection might not result in
changes in wages or employment status, but might signi￿cantly alter future job prospects
and therefore workers￿current wellbeing. In order to overcome this problem, Blanchard
and Landier (2002) use data on wages and transition probabilities to construct an "em-
pirical counterpart" of utility to assess the welfare e⁄ect of the introduction of ￿xed-term
contracts in France. This paper pursues a di⁄erent avenue and explores the use of subjec-
tive wellbeing data. Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006) and Kahneman and Krueger (2006)
stress that such data can be particularly useful in settings where observed behavior has
ambiguous welfare implications.
While permanent employees are considered as well, the main focus of the analysis is
on temporary workers. In recent years, such group of workers has been at the center
2of an academic and policy debate fueled by the evidence that they often su⁄er poorer
worker conditions (OECD, 2002; Booth et al., 2002; Arulampalam and Booth, 1998;
Arulampalam et al., 2004; Kahn, 2007; Brunello et al., 2007). Particularly interesting for
the purpose of this paper is the ￿nding of Booth et al. (2002) that temporary workers
report lower satisfaction with several aspects of their jobs in the UK. For the same
country, Bardasi and Francesconi (2004) report no long-term negative e⁄ects of limited-
duration contracts, while Petrongolo (2004) ￿nds lower job satisfaction among temporary
workers across Europe and especially in Southern countries. The evidence presented in
this paper can therefore begin to shed some light on whether regulations designed to
protect permanent workers and restrict the use of temporary employment can play a role
in improving temporary workers￿wellbeing.
The analysis uses measures of job satisfaction which have been found to correlate
with workers￿wellbeing (Warr, 1999; Argyle, 2001) and to predict quits (Freeman, 1978;
Clark, 2001; LØvy-Garboua et al., 2007). I estimate job satisfaction equations using micro
panel data on a large sample of temporary and permanent employees from 7 waves of
the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). I control for country unobserved
heterogeneity and time e⁄ects and allow individual random e⁄ects. While the nonlinear
nature of the model advises against ￿xed e⁄ects, I also use a correlated random e⁄ects
model (Mundlak, 1978) to allow for some correlation between (individual) unobserved
heterogeneity and the included regressors. EPL and RTE are measured by using the newly
released time-series indicators produced by the OECD (2004) and potential di⁄erences
in their e⁄ects across the private and public sectors are explored.
Signi￿cant e⁄ects are found almost exclusively for temporary workers. The robustness
of such results is further investigated using subsamples by gender, age and geographical
3location. Furthermore, country-speci￿c time trends are allowed and measures of satis-
faction with di⁄erent aspects of one￿ s job are used to try and disentangle the channels
through which RTE and EPL may a⁄ect temporary workers￿overall satisfaction.
Using ECHP data, Clark and Postel-Vinay (2009) have previously found a negative
link between job security and regulations, as measured by a cross-sectional indicator aver-
aging EPL and RTE (OECD, 1999). As I am interested in evaluating the overall wellbeing
e⁄ects of labour contract regulations, I adopt a more general measure of wellbeing (i.e.
job satisfaction) rather than focusing on job security. Moreover, I look at the e⁄ects of
EPL and RTE separately as the two exhibit di⁄erent degrees of variation and I intend
to capture the consequences of reforms changing the two sets of regulations in di⁄erent
ways. Finally, the EPL and RTE indicators I use vary both across countries and over
time. The focus on the e⁄ects of the two dimensions of legislation on both temporary
and permanent employees is also what di⁄erentiates this paper from Wasmer (2006) who
uses Canadian data on permanent employees to ￿nd a positive correlation between the
stringency of protection and job stress.
The main conclusion of the paper is that reforms that ease RTE but leave EPL un-
changed are positively correlated with wellbeing of both temporary and permanent work-
ers, particularly for women and the young. To the extent that wellbeing gains translate
into support for given policies, this ￿nding is not consistent with the common assumption
in the political economy literature that only permanent workers oppose reforms that relax
EPL.
42 Employment protection legislation and restrictions
to the use of temporary employment
This paper presents one of the ￿rst applications of the new regulation indicators proposed
in OECD (2004). The OECD overall indicator of regulation results from the aggregation
of 18 basis indicators concerning three broad areas of regulation: 1) regular contracts 2)
temporary contracts and 3) speci￿c requirements for collective dismissals. A time series
is only available for the ￿rst two. I refer to the ￿rst as employment protection legislation
(EPL) and to the second as restrictions on temporary employment (RTE).
The basic indicators aggregated to obtain the EPL index concern the procedural
di¢ culties faced by the ￿rm in ￿ring a worker, the strictness of the de￿nition of unfair
dismissal, and the notice period and severance pay in case of no-fault dismissal. The RTE
index measures restrictions to the use of ￿xed-term and temporary work agency workers,
namely (i) limitations to cases where these workers can be employed, (ii) limits to the
number of renewals and (iii) limits to the cumulative duration of temporary contracts.
Details on how the indicators are constructed can be found in OECD (2004) along with
a descriptions of the main changes in legislation occurred in each country over the last
twenty years.
Previous cross-sectional versions of the OECD indicators have been used, among oth-
ers, by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000); Kahn (2007). Nicoletti et al. (2000) used factor
analysis to ￿nd that the 1999 version of the indicator is not particularly sensitive to dif-
ferent weighting schemes while Addison and Teixeira (2003) have shown that it correlates
well with other measures of rigidity constructed from employers￿answers to surveys and
even with more broadly de￿ned indicators of economic freedom.
5Figure 1 plots the time-series of EPL for 14 European countries. Portugal and the
UK stand out as the most rigid and the most ￿ exible countries respectively. The graph
clearly shows that while there is a certain level of cross-country variation, the time-series
variation has been rather limited over the last decade both in terms of the number of and
the scope of the changes occurred. Seven countries have changed this set of regulations.
Four of them (Finland, Spain, Denmark and the Netherlands) have eased restrictions on
￿ring permanent workers, while the remaining three (UK, France, and Belgium) have
strengthened them. Quite a di⁄erent picture is shown in ￿gure 2 where the time-series of
RTE are plotted. Most of the countries which have brought about changes have relaxed
the stringency of these regulations. Out of the seven countries for which a change in
RTE is recorded, only for Spain does this change show a positive sign. While the UK
and Ireland stand out as the most ￿ exible countries in the use of temporary employment,
Italy and Belgium appear to have brought about the most dramatic changes in their
legislation moving from the top of the chart to the middle of it.
3 Theoretical literature
The theoretical framework most commonly adopted to model regulations for both tem-
porary and permanent workers is the matching model (Wasmer, 1999; Pissarides, 2000;
Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002; Cahuc and Zylberberg,
2004). In this framework the life-time expected utility of risk-neutral workers is a func-
tion of their instantaneous utility in di⁄erent labour market status and of the probabilities
of moving across them. The general equilibrium e⁄ects of regulations on permanent and
temporary contracts are complex when job destruction is endogenous because they a⁄ect
worker￿ s utility (i) directly, (ii) through the transition probabilities, and (iii) through the
6wage1.
The direct e⁄ect follows from severance pay being a component of these regulations,
at least for permanent workers. Changes in transition probabilities take place because
regulations on hiring temporary workers or ￿ring permanent workers obviously a⁄ect both
job creation and job destruction. Finally, regulations a⁄ect workers￿bargaining strength
and the value of the outside options (via their e⁄ect on transition probabilities) therefore
altering the wages resulting from bargaining.
Most of the papers, however, model regulations for the two types of contracts as dif-
ferent ￿ring costs, whereas in reality regulations on temporary contracts do not normally
take such form. An exception is Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002), where a ￿xed-term
contract entails no ￿ring costs but there is a legal restriction on the number of employees
who can be hired on a temporary contract. In this set up, the higher the ￿ring cost
for permanent workers, the lower the conversion rate from ￿xed-term to permanent con-
tracts implying that the destruction rate of temporary jobs increases. Moreover, less
severe restrictions on the use of temporary contracts increase both job creation (because
temporary jobs, not entailing ￿ring costs, yield a higher surplus) and job destruction
(because the improvement in the outside option following the increase in job creation
increases the threshold productivity below which a match is ended), with the latter e⁄ect
being particularly strong when ￿ring costs are high. They therefore obtain a theoretically
ambiguous e⁄ect on the welfare of the employed who are faced with both an increase in
the value of unemployment (because of the increase in the exit rate from unemployment)
and an increase in the probability of becoming unemployed.
Insider-outsider models can also provide insights on the e⁄ects of ￿ring costs on work-
1As noted by a referee, the relative importance of changes in future and current states of the world
will depend on the discount rate as well.
7ers￿wellbeing. Clearly, ￿ring costs enable permanent workers to obtain higher wages and
extra-wage bene￿ts when bargaining with the ￿rm, leading to an increase in their wellbe-
ing. Moreover, as pointed out by Dolado et al. (2002), the presence of temporary workers
can provide a protective bu⁄er for permanent workers further increasing their bargaining
strength. Hence, regulations restricting the use of temporary workers can have negative
e⁄ects on permanent workers￿wellbeing. In line with the literature which sees permanent
workers as the insiders, the literature on the determinants of EPL has generally taken
the view that temporary workers, not being directly protected by such regulations, are
part of the pool of outsiders who oppose stringent protection for the insiders. When this
point is not made explicitly as in Dolado et al. (2002), it appears to be implicit in the
argument whereby the political support for EPL comes exclusively from those directly
protected by it (Saint-Paul, 2002; Boeri et al., 2003).
Wasmer (2006) has a theoretical model with permanent workers alone where the strin-
gency of employment protection induces ￿rms to increase the intensity of their monitoring
with an increase in stress for the workers. In order to induce voluntary quits which are not
subject to ￿ring costs, ￿rms will also worsen working conditions for workers in matches
which in the absence of regulations would be ended. In this framework, the e⁄ect of
employment protection on workers￿wellbeing is therefore negative.
Finally, a common feature of the models described above is that workers are risk-
neutral. When workers are risk-adverse, the mere stability of a job arising from higher
legal protection can positively a⁄ect workers wellbeing. However, since regulations on
temporary employment take the form of limits to the use of these types of contracts, it
is not obvious how such regulations a⁄ect risk-adverse temporary employees.
83.1 Theoretical predictions
Based on the literature reviewed in the previous section, I can summarize the hypotheses
on the e⁄ects of regulations on permanent workers￿wellbeing.
1. The e⁄ect of restrictions on temporary employment on permanent worker￿ s wellbeing
is negative. This is because RTE reduce job creation leading to a more stagnant
labour market, increase the exposure of permanent workers to demand ￿ uctuations,
and limit the strength of permanent insiders hindering their ability to obtain higher
wages and non-wage bene￿ts.
2. The e⁄ect of protection for permanent contracts on permanent worker￿ s wellbeing
is ambiguous. A more stagnant labour market reduces the value of the outside
option, but EPL protects workers from the risk of unemployment and increases
their bargaining strength. If ￿rms respond to the ￿ring costs by increasing the
monitoring of the workers, their stress can increase and their wellbeing decrease.
To formulate predictions of the e⁄ects of regulations on temporary workers￿wellbeing,
the arguments from the theoretical models have to be integrated with intuition taking
into account what exactly the indicators used in the empirical analysis measure.
1. The e⁄ect of restrictions on temporary employment on temporary workers￿wellbe-
ing is ambiguous. RTE lead to a stagnant labour market, increasing the risk of
unemployment when the contract expires. They also make it more di¢ cult to have
a contract renewed, but this can also potentially increase the probability of moving
into permanent employment. Finally, more restrictions can decrease permanent
insiders￿strength in the bargaining process, improving temporary workers￿relative
conditions.
92. The e⁄ect of protection for permanent contracts on temporary workers￿wellbeing is
ambiguous. While EPL increases permanent workers￿strength and makes unem-
ployment more stagnant, temporary employees might be willing to accept current
insecurity in exchange for future higher protection.
Finally, in spite of the theoretical uncertainty on the precise e⁄ect of regulations on
temporary workers￿wellbeing, the general assumption in the political economy litera-
ture on the determinants of regulations is that temporary employees oppose protection
for permanent workers, presumably because that reduces their utility by lowering their
chances to enter the protected segment of the labour market.
4 Empirical literature
The vast majority of the empirical literature explicitly considering both EPL and EPL has
focused on their e⁄ects on labour market performance. The bulk of the evidence suggests
that relaxation of regulations for temporary contracts does not necessarily lead to an
improvement of labour market conditions (OECD, 1999, 2004; Blanchard and Landier,
2002; Dolado et al., 2002; Freeman, 2005). Among the few empirical studies which have
tried to investigate the wellbeing e⁄ects of regulations are Blanchard and Landier (2002);
Clark and Postel-Vinay (2009); Wasmer (2006).
Blanchard and Landier (2002) attempt to evaluate the welfare e⁄ects of the introduc-
tion of ￿xed-term contracts in France. They construct a measure of the average expected
present value of utility using available information on income and transition probabilities
across di⁄erent states and conclude that there is some evidence of a negative e⁄ect of
these reforms on young workers￿welfare.
10Clark and Postel-Vinay (2009) study satisfaction with security of male respondents
in the last ￿ve waves of the ECHP. Regulations are measured by the OECD (2004)
cross-country indicator aggregating both EPL and RTE. They use a latent class model to
account for selection of workers into di⁄erent types of jobs and ￿nd a negative relationship
between (overall) regulations and perceived job security for temporary and permanent
workers.
Wasmer (2006) looks at the wellbeing e⁄ects of ￿ring costs on permanent workers
alone. Using longitudinal individual data for Canada over the period spanning from
1994 to 2003, he ￿nds that regional variation in employment protection (for permanent
workers) is positively correlated with job stress, concluding that stricter legal protection
reduces workers￿wellbeing.
5 Job satisfaction as a measure of workers￿wellbeing
The brief review of the theoretical literature in the previous sections has highlighted the
complexity of the e⁄ects of regulations on workers￿utility. Di Tella and MacCulloch
(2006) discuss the usefulness of subjective wellbeing data for policy evaluation in settings
like the present one where the theoretical link between behavior and welfare is ambiguous.
The use of subjective wellbeing measures in welfare analysis has been recently advocated
by Kahneman and Krueger (2006) while Layard (2006) discusses the policy implications
of the subjective wellbeing literature. Among the papers which have explicitly used
subjective indicators as proxy for utility in economics are Vendrik and Woltjer (2007),
Luttmer (2005), Ferrer-i Carbonell (2005), Blanch￿ ower and Oswald (2004), Tella et al.
(2003), Clark (2003), Frey and Stutzer (2002), Di Tella et al. (2001), and Clark and
Oswald (1996).
11All of these authors obviously acknowledge the caveats of such measures. Kahneman
and Krueger (2006) point out that since subjective wellbeing data re￿ ect people￿ s per-
ceptions of their experiences, they are not necessarily a measure of utility as traditionally
conceived by economists. They also discuss how people￿ s answers may be a⁄ected by
context and mood, but do not see these issues as disqualifying such measures especially
in large representative samples. Easterlin (2001) presents similar arguments along with
others based on the psychology literature supporting comparability across countries of
self-reported wellbeing. Moreover, Kahneman and Krueger (2006) stress that subjective
wellbeing measures have been found to predict certain behaviors and to correlate in ex-
pected ways with characteristics of individuals. As the authors point out, this applies to
the measure adopted in this paper, i.e. job satisfaction, which has been found to pre-
dict quits (Freeman, 1978; Clark, 2001; LØvy-Garboua et al., 2007). Hamermesh (2001)
sees this as a compelling reason to study job satisfaction. Other economics papers using
job satisfaction include Heywood et al. (2002), who investigate the satisfaction of union
members and public sector employees, and Booth et al. (2002), who ￿nds that temporary
employees are less satis￿ed than permanent employees.
Warr (1999) and Argyle (2001) review the psychology evidence on the link between
job satisfaction and overall wellbeing. They also discuss the literature ￿nding that job
satisfaction correlates in meaningful ways with many individual and job characteristics
and with other behaviors such as absenteeism, job performance and employees￿willingness
to help coworkers and their organization. As I am interested in the e⁄ects of labour
market regulation, the use of job satisfaction as a wellbeing variable appears intuitive.
Furthermore, the ECHP does not contain more general wellbeing questions, nor am I
aware of other international and longitudinal datasets containing wellbeing measures. The
12maintained assumption is simply that reported job satisfaction is a monotonic function of
underlying wellbeing. Since I intend to assess the overall e⁄ect of legislation on workers￿
wellbeing, the main focus of the paper is on overall job satisfaction rather than satisfaction
with speci￿c aspects of one￿ s job.
In the ECHP workers are asked to rate their overall satisfaction with their job on a
scale from 1 to 6. Moreover, they are asked about their satisfaction with speci￿c aspects
of their jobs. I try to exploit this information to understand the channel through which
regulation can a⁄ect overall job satisfaction of temporary workers. The basic assumption







ji + "i (1)
where Sat￿
ji is satisfaction of individual i with aspect j of her job. The star indicates
that this continuos measure of satisfaction is a latent variable that is not actually ob-
served by the researcher who only sees its mapping into a discrete variable, i.e. reported
job satisfaction. Overall job satisfaction is therefore seen as the linear combination of
satisfaction in di⁄erent domains.
6 The empirical model
6.1 Data
The ECHP is a standardized longitudinal survey which was carried out between 1994
and 2001 in all member states of the EU under the coordination of Eurostat. It includes
information at the household and individual level in a wide range of topics (income,
employment, health, housing etc.). A detailed description of the dataset and a discussion
13of the methodological issues involved is in Peracchi (2002).
I restrict the sample to individuals aged between 16 and 65 and working either on
a permanent or temporary contract2. Data from 13 countries are used in the analysis,
leaving out Sweden and Luxembourg for which job satisfaction is missing. For Germany,
the job satisfaction question was only asked to the ECHP-speci￿c sample in the ￿rst
three waves. Moreover, the German sample does not have information about the region
of residence, which means that I cannot use that country at all when including regional
unemployment as a covariate. The regional unemployment rates come from the REGIO
database of EUROSTAT and were matched with the regional identi￿er available in the
ECHP3. Since data from the ￿rst wave do not include information on the type of contract
of a worker, the empirical analysis only uses data from waves 2 to 8.
6.2 The econometric model and speci￿cation
I employ an individual random e⁄ects ordered probit to take into account (i) the lon-
gitudinal structure of our data and (ii) the ordinal nature of the dependent variable4.
2The variable contract type is only available for employees working at least 15 hours per week, leading
to an unavoidable underrepresentation of part-time workers in the ￿nal sample. A rough look at the full
sample (pooling all data and waves together) reveals that we are indeed excluding 30% of part-timers.
However, those individual represent less than 4% of the total number of employees in the ECHP. Finally,
it should be noted that when we look at individuals working more than 15 hours, we see that there are
more part-timers among temporary workers (11%) than among permanent workers (7%). Therefore, by
excluding those working less than 15 hours, we are likely to be excluding more temporary than permanent
workers.
3In some cases, the level of aggregation did not coincide between the two datasets. Where the
ECHP presented regions at a lower level than the REGIO datasets, each region was assigned the same
unemployment rate.
For some regions, data were missing for the ￿rst year (1994), while they were available at a higher
level of aggregation. In such cases the data for 1994 were reconstructed as follow: ￿rst, the average ratio
between the regional unemployment and that of the larger region within which that region is contained
was calculated over the available years; then the missing data were obtained by applying the same ratio
to the unemployment rate of the larger region in the year for which the data were missing.
For The Nederlands and Denmark the unemployment rate is the national unemployment rate. This is
also for most regions of Portugal and for Ireland excluding Dublin. For Italy, the unemployment rates for
the macro regions of the ECHP were calculated as simple averages of the available data for the individual
regions.
4Estimation is conducted using the gllamm programme in STATA 9.2 (Rabe-Hesketh et al., 2004).
14The random e⁄ects speci￿cation assumes that the individual heterogeneity is indepen-
dent of the included regressors and normally distributed with mean zero and constant
variance. Since the nonlinearity of the ordered probit means that a ￿xed e⁄ects estima-
tor would remain inconsistent5, I resort to a correlated random e⁄ects model (Mundlak,
1978) whereby the individual-level mean of unobserved heterogeneity is set equal to the
within-individual mean of the time varying regressors. All speci￿cations, however, do
include country ￿xed e⁄ects and time e⁄ects.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level because of the pres-
ence of the EPL and RTE indicators. This remains necessary even after the inclusion
of country ￿xed-e⁄ects as by pooling countries together any cross-country heterogeneity
in the slope coe¢ cients is e⁄ectively relegated into the error term (Wooldridge, 2003).
I adopt conservative critical values because the small number of clusters might lead to
downward biased standard errors (Wooldridge, 2003), an aspect often neglected in the
applied literature6. Table 1 shows that in a speci￿cation including only exogenous re-
gressors, the correlation between the regulation variables and job satisfaction exhibits the
same sign for permanent and temporary workers. In particular, satisfaction of both types
of workers is positively associated with stronger protection for permanent workers and
negatively with restrictions on temporary employment. Statistical signi￿cance, however,
is not always obtained. The rest of the paper tries to shed more light on the link between
regulation and wellbeing by including additional controls and by focusing on di⁄erent
groups for which di⁄erent results might be expected.
Common to all the speci￿cations adopted is the inclusion of the following standard
5Greene (2007) reviews some of the recent attempts to control for ￿xed e⁄ects in an ordered logit
including the application to job satisfaction by D￿ Addio et al. (2007).
6When regional controls are included, I still adopt a correction for country-level clusters as that leaves
the within-cluster (regional) correlation unrestricted. Clustering at levels that do not nest individuals
(i.e. by country and year) is not possible given the presence of individual random e⁄ects.
15controls for job satisfaction equations: age, age squared, female, part-time, married, edu-
cation, occupation and industry dummies7, a dummy for (self-reported) health problems,
log of hours worked per week, dummies for the presence of children in the household
and job status dummies (supervisory, intermediate or other). Due to the high number of
missing values (in particular for some countries) I am unable to include other potentially
relevant controls such as ￿rm size (as reported by the employees) and extra-wage bene￿ts.
The ￿rst speci￿cation I use does not include a control for the wage. Following the
theory, this is meant to let the legislation indicators capture the direct and indirect e⁄ects
of regulations on satisfaction.
In the second speci￿cation I include the log of monthly real net wage (in PPS) to look
at the e⁄ect of regulation for a given wage. I then include the regional unemployment
rate as a control variable. I expect it to capture features of the local labour market
which go beyond those determined by EPL and RTE for two main reasons: in the ￿rst
place legislation is de￿ned at the national level (although it might be argued that its
enforcement di⁄er across regions), while countries exhibit quite large cross regional vari-
ations in unemployment; in the second place, theory predicts that the e⁄ect of EPL on
unemployment is ambiguous and empirical studies do not ￿nd a clear correlation between
unemployment and EPL. In a parallel and independent paper studying the e⁄ects of pro-
tection for permanent workers on job stress, Wasmer (2006) follows a similar approach.
Moreover, the inclusion of local unemployment is in line with the work on happiness and
life satisfaction of Di Tella et al. (2001) and Blanch￿ ower and Oswald (2005).
7Since computation time is proportional to the squared of the number of parameters when using
gllamm (Rabe-Hesketh et al, 2004), we adopted a parsimonious speci￿cation including only 2 industries
dummies for Industry and Services instead of the 16 which ideally we could have included. Not sur-
prisingly, when the full set of available industry dummies was included using our smallest samples, the
results did not change in any relevant way.
166.3 Are these policy changes exogenous?
If the variation in labour contract regulation is exogenous, the correlations found in
the regressions can be given a causal interpretation. Endogeneity can arise because of
correlation between the regressors and either the unobserved individual heterogeneity or
the residual job satisfaction. Absence of correlation between individual heterogeneity
and labour market regulation is a reasonable assumption after controlling for country
￿xed-e⁄ects and time e⁄ects. In fact, di⁄erences in national legislation are likely to
re￿ ect cultural di⁄erences across countries, rather than personality di⁄erences across
individuals8.
As for the potential correlation with residual job satisfaction, in this panel data setting,
consistency requires that current shocks must not be correlated with past, present and
future EPL and RTE. If one thinks of the error term as a pure uncorrelated idiosyncratic
shock a⁄ecting job satisfaction in each period (as in a correctly speci￿ed model), then it
is clear that it cannot be correlated with past legislation. Moreover, contemporaneous
correlation appears unlikely given that in all countries procedures to change national
legislation are rather lengthy (Br￿gemann, 2007).
Arguably, even future legislation is unlikely to be correlated with a past transitory
shock given the complexity and duration of the reform process. Legislation is likely to
re￿ ect structural features of a national labour market rather than past transitory shocks.
In particular, labour market reforms of EPL and RTE were encouraged by the consen-
sus view in international organizations as one (if not the) instrument to tackle high and
persistent unemployment, at least for some demographic groups such as the young and
women (Freeman, 2005). This suggests that unemployment and demographic character-
8For example, Algan and Cahuc (2006b,a) explain di⁄erences in EPL across countries using cross-
country di⁄erences in civic attitudes and religion.
17istics are likely to be among the main determinants of labour policies. Controlling for
these variables, as I do in at least some of the speci￿cations, should therefore help remove
these confounding e⁄ects.
It is still possible, however, that other institutional changes I am unable to control for
might have occurred at the same time as EPL or RTE changes. As in any cross-country
study it is virtually impossible to satisfactorily control for every other institutional as-
pect or to ￿nd suitable instruments a⁄ecting exclusively EPL and RTE. I attempt to
mitigate the problem (i) by including country and time e⁄ects and (ii) by investigating
the possible role of unemployment bene￿ts when discussing our results. The latter is, in
fact, the institutional aspect which is arguably most likely to play a role similar to that
of employment protection in insuring the worker against the risk of unemployment.
Finally, a word of caution on the sense in which selection into contract types can
pose a problem for the analysis of this paper. The possibility that people with inherently
di⁄erent levels of wellbeing might select themselves into di⁄erent contract types is a
relevant concern if one looks at di⁄erences in wellbeing across contract types. In this
paper, on the other hand, the focus is on the e⁄ects of regulations on wellbeing within
contract types. Hence, the assumption maintained throughout the analysis is that the
strictness of EPL and RTE does not interact with unobserved heterogeneity in the process
that determines selection into di⁄erent contracts. While I do not attempt to relax such
assumption, as previously mentioned, I check the robustness of the results in a correlated
random e⁄ect model (Mundlak, 1978) that allows some correlation between the individual
e⁄ects and the included regressors.
187 Results for permanent workers
Table 2 reports the results for job satisfaction for permanent workers. Column 1 shows
that when the wage is omitted, the EPL and RTE attract a positive and a negative sign
respectively, but both fail to reach statistical signi￿cance. When the wage is included, the
coe¢ cients on the regulation variables change slightly. In particular, while protection for
permanent workers remains positive but statistically insigni￿cant, restrictions on tempo-
rary employment are now signi￿cant at the 10% level, a result that must be taken with
caution given the possible downward bias of the standard errors due to the small number
of clusters in the data (Wooldridge, 2003). Column 3 illustrates that when the individual
unobserved component is allowed to be correlated with the included regressors, similar
results are obtained for the regulation variables, with RTE now on the verge of statistical
signi￿cance at the 5% level9.
To interpret the magnitude of these coe¢ cients, rather than looking at marginal e⁄ects
which vary across the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity, it is informative to
compare the relevant coe¢ cients to that on log of wage. Our estimates indicate that an
increase in ￿ring restrictions from the lowest level (.95 in the UK) to the median level
(2.61 in Spain) has the same e⁄ect on the distribution of reported satisfaction as an
impressive 58% increase in real wage. Similarly, an increase in restrictions on temporary
employment from the lowest level (.25 in Ireland and UK) to the median value (3.25 in
Spain) is equivalent to a 36% cut in wage. These estimates must be read bearing in
mind that a number of personal and job characteristics are being controlled for therefore
making the e⁄ect of real wage on satisfaction relatively small, as commonly found in the
9Results from a linear model with ￿xed e⁄ects are qualitatevely similar, with EPL attracting a
statistically insigni￿cant postive coe¢ cient and RTE a statistically signi￿cant negative one.
19literature (Easterlin, 2001). Finally, when unemployment is controlled for (column 3), the
two regulations change only marginally and local unemployment itself shows a negative
but insigni￿cant coe¢ cient.
To summarise, since our estimates fail to reach satisfactory levels of statistical signif-
icance, I am not able to draw strong conclusions from these results. However, I do ￿nd
that in our sample permanent workers￿satisfaction is positively correlated with ￿ring re-
strictions and, as expected from economic theory, negatively correlated with restrictions
to the use of temporary employment.
7.1 Public and Private Sector Employees
The speci￿cations considered so far included a dummy for the public sector to capture
systematic di⁄erences between the two sectors in reported satisfaction. However, there are
reasons to suspect that regulation may a⁄ect employees from the two sectors in di⁄erent
ways. In the ￿rst place, public sector employees are not exposed to the same kind of
uncertainty as their private sector counterpart (i.e. demand ￿ uctuations) and therefore,
even in the presence of the same degree of legal protection, the actual relevance of such
protection may di⁄er sharply between the two sectors. In the second place, several
countries have di⁄erent regulations concerning public employees and the extent to which
this is taken into account by the OECD (2004) indicator employed in this analysis is
not clear. To allow the e⁄ect of regulation to di⁄er between private and public sector, I
interact the regulations variables with the dummies for private and public sector and then
I test whether these coe¢ cients are di⁄erent using a robust Wald test. The results are
reported in table 3. Protection for permanent workers con￿rms a positive sign for both
private and public sector employees, but it again fails to reach statistical signi￿cance even
20at the 10% level. The Wald test fails to reject the null the two coe¢ cients are di⁄erent.
RTE, on the other hand, exhibits a positive and insigni￿cant coe¢ cient for public
sector employees, but a negative and strongly signi￿cant coe¢ cient in the private sector.
The statistically week result described for the full sample in the previous paragraph
seems therefore to be entirely driven by the private sector. The Wald test supports the
conclusion that the e⁄ect of regulations on temporary employment di⁄er between the
private and public sector.
Economic theory suggests that RTE may have negative e⁄ects on permanent workers￿
wellbeing because they reduce (permanent) insiders￿strength and increase their exposure
to labour market ￿ uctuations. Since public sector employees are inherently less exposed to
labour market forces, the ￿nding that regulations on temporary employment only a⁄ects
private sector permanent employees seems consistent with the theory. On the other hand,
these di⁄erent ￿ndings for the private and public sector can be seen as evidence that the
indicator being used is actually a good measure of legal protection, as it correlates with
job satisfaction in di⁄erent ways for di⁄erent workers as expected.
8 Results for temporary workers
8.1 Job Satisfaction
I begin by looking at the job satisfaction equation for ￿xed-term workers in table 4.
Column one shows that the overall e⁄ect of RTE on ￿xed-term workers￿satisfaction is
negative and statistically signi￿cant at the 1% level, while that of protection for perma-
nent workers is positive but far from reaching statistical signi￿cance at any conventional
level.
21The introduction of the real wage into the speci￿cation in column 2 does not alter the
results for the regulation indicators and I can again reject the null of a zero coe¢ cient
on RTE even at the most conservative level. The coe¢ cient is slightly larger than in
the previous speci￿cation and comparison with that on log of real wage reveals that the
Italian reforms (the largest in Europe over the period considered) were equivalent to a
44% increase in real wage. These apparently large e⁄ects are mainly driven by the limited
e⁄ect of real wage on job satisfaction, once items such as education and occupation are
controlled for (Easterlin, 2001). Column 3 in table 4 shows that the results do not change
substantially if some correlation is allowed between the unobserved heterogeneity and the
included (individual-level) regressors10.
When the speci￿cation is extended to include local unemployment, this latter exhibits
a negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient and the coe¢ cients on both types of regulations
increase in magnitude with that on EPL now reaching statistical signi￿cance at the 5%
level. As previously discussed, the inclusion of the unemployment variable causes the
loss of all observations for Germany, but several checks performed with a pooled ordered
probit indicate that the signi￿cance of the EPL variable in this speci￿cation is not driven
by the di⁄erent sample used11. The size of the coe¢ cients implies that an increase from
the minimum level of restrictions (0.95 in the UK) to the median level (2.61 in Spain) is
equivalent to a 75% increase in real wage.
In all the speci￿cations considered so far, country e⁄ects are controlled for and year
e⁄ects allow for ￿ exible common time trends. Given the limited underlying variation
and the relatively short period of time I am able to exploit, it is obviously di¢ cult to
10Results from a linear model with ￿xed e⁄ects con￿rm a negative and statisticaly signi￿cant coe¢ -
cient for RTE. On the other hand, EPL attracts a negative coe¢ cient, but remain highly statistically
insigni￿cant.
11These results are available from the author upon request.
22empirically distinguish between the e⁄ect of changes in legislation and possible underly-
ing country-speci￿c trends. The results in the last column of table 4 are therefore not
surprising. The coe¢ cient on RTE, which is consistently negative and signi￿cant in all
previous speci￿cations, shrinks and, although still negative, becomes statistically indis-
tinguishable from zero This casts doubts on the robustness of our results, but in light of
the amount of variation I can exploit to identify both trends and legislation e⁄ects, one
could argue that I am asking too much of the data. Additional evidence could come from
longer periods of time or from identi￿cation strategies exploiting within-country varia-
tion in legislation, although objections could always be raised concerning the possibility
of non-linear and/or regional trends.
Table 5 shows that the negative sign of RTE is found both in Northern and Southern
Europe. Statistical signi￿cance is clearly attained for the Southern countries, while for
Northern Europe the inclusion of France seems to matter, making the coe¢ cient on RTE
insigni￿cant. As for EPL, the limited variation in the indicator means that the e⁄ect is
again rather imprecisely estimated with the sign of the coe¢ cient changing depending
on how North and South are de￿ned. There is some evidence, however, that the posi-
tive correlation found when using all countries is mainly driven by Southern European
countries.
When job satisfaction equations are estimated separately for males and females, the
negative and signi￿cant sign on RTE is only found for females, as shown in columns 1 and
2 of table 6. This result, coupled with the lower coe¢ cient on income for women, leads
to the striking result that the Italian labour market reforms were equivalent, in terms of
job satisfaction, to a 95% increase in wage. Similarly, in columns 3 and 4 I ￿nd that only
young temporary employees are negatively a⁄ected by RTE and since their satisfaction
23seems to be relatively little sensitive to income, the estimated coe¢ cients imply that the
Italian reforms are equivalent to a 59% increase in wage, whereas for adults the ￿gure
is 27% (but note that the coe¢ cient on the regulation variable does not reach statistical
signi￿cance).
To summarize, our results provide evidence of a negative relationship between restric-
tions on temporary employment and wellbeing of temporary employees in particular for
women and the young. Such result is robust to the inclusion of country e⁄ects and ￿ exible
common trends, but, given the limited variation available, statistical signi￿cance is lost
when country-speci￿c time trends are allowed. I have also obtained some evidence of a
positive correlation between protection for permanent workers and temporary workers￿
satisfaction, which appears large in magnitude and statistically signi￿cant when unem-
ployment is controlled for. These results seem to be driven by countries in Southern
Europe.
8.2 Domain Satisfaction
I now turn to measures of satisfaction in di⁄erent domains to investigate whether the
correlations found in the previous section are driven by some factors that I have not been
able to control for, namely job security and working conditions. If such items correlate
with satisfaction and regulations a⁄ect either or both, the regulation indicators would
pick up their e⁄ects in the overall job satisfaction equations. In the absence of objective
indicators in my dataset, looking at satisfaction with these items is as far as I can go in
trying to understand whether the e⁄ect of regulations is taking place through job security
or working conditions.
Theory makes clear that both protection for permanent workers and restrictions on
24temporary employment a⁄ect job creation and job destruction therefore a⁄ecting tempo-
rary workers￿security. As for working conditions, if by improving their own, permanent
workers a⁄ect working conditions for temporary workers, then regulations a⁄ecting the
strength of permanent workers will be correlated with temporary workers￿working condi-
tions. Following the insider-outsider logic mentioned in the theory section, this reasoning
can be applied to both EPL and RTE.
8.2.1 Satisfaction with Security
Table 7 shows that when the dependent variable is satisfaction with security, the coef-
￿cients on both regulation variables turn out positive but statistically insigni￿cant, but
when unemployment is included in the speci￿cation, EPL becomes highly signi￿cant12.
This ￿nding is consistent with the interpretation provided above whereby currently tem-
porary workers value the security they will enjoy once on a permanent contract. In
particular, the local unemployment variable can be seen as a proxy for the di¢ culty of
getting a stable job. After removing such e⁄ect, temporary workers￿ s wellbeing is pos-
itively a⁄ected by future protection. On the other hand, the statistical and economic
insigni￿cance of RTE suggests that job security is not the channel through which such
regulations a⁄ect overall job satisfaction.
When I look at satisfaction with security separately for men and women, I ￿nd that
EPL attracts a positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient for both genders providing additional
support to the hypothesis that temporary workers are positively a⁄ected by protection
for permanent workers. The results in table 7 also show that RTE is positive for men, but
12When the model without the unemployment variable was ran on the same sample as the model with
unemployment, the same results were obtained. This suggests that the di⁄erence in results between the
two speci￿cations is not driven by a di⁄erence in the sample being used. These results are available upon
request.
25negative for women and in both cases not statistically signi￿cant. Temporary employ-
ees in the public sector report lower satisfaction with security than their private sector
counterpart regardless of their gender.
8.2.2 Satisfaction with working conditions and type of work
Table 8 shows that there is no evidence that the overall negative correlation between RTE
and temporary employees￿satisfaction is driven by satisfaction with working conditions
or type of work. EPL, on the other hand, seems to be positively correlated with these
two domains, especially with satisfaction with working conditions. This suggests that
better working conditions might be an additional channel through which this dimension
of regulation a⁄ects temporary workers￿job satisfaction. An outsider-insider interpre-
tation would argue that there are positive spillovers from protected permanent workers
to temporary workers, for example because the improvements obtained by permanent
workers are workplace speci￿c rather than job speci￿c.
8.3 Public and Private Sector Employees
I ran a speci￿cation to allow the e⁄ect of regulation to di⁄er between the private and the
public sector to take into account the fact that the two sectors face inherently di⁄erent
kinds of uncertainty. Adopting the strategy previously described for permanent workers,
I obtained the results reported in table 9 for job satisfaction (column 1 and 2) and
satisfaction with security (column 3 and 4).
I ￿nd clear evidence that the negative e⁄ect on job satisfaction of RTE is driven by
the private sector temporary employees. For the public sector the e⁄ect is still negative
but not signi￿cant and a robust Wald test allows us to reject the null of the e⁄ect being
26constant between sectors. The di⁄erence in the e⁄ect of regulations might be explained
by the di⁄erent reasons for using temporary employment in the two sectors. In particular,
because of the very nature of public sector jobs it seems likely that temporary jobs in this
sector are not used to deal with demand uncertainty. If this is the case, then public sector
temporary employees are likely to be less concerned with the implications of restrictions
on the use of temporary contracts.
When looking at satisfaction with security, I again ￿nd that controlling for local un-
employment both public and private sector temporary employees seem to bene￿t from
higher protection for permanent employees. The Wald test cannot reject the null hypoth-
esis that both regulation variables have the same e⁄ect in the two sectors. RTE do not
seem to have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on temporary worker￿ s satisfaction with security, in some
cases attracting a positive sign, as opposed to the negative one found in the job satis-
faction equations. This again suggests the surprising fact that the e⁄ect of employment
protection on workers￿satisfaction does not run through satisfaction with security.
9 Discussion of results
This paper has found only statistically weak evidence that stricter protection translates
into higher job satisfaction for permanent workers. The lack of precision of the estimates
might well be due to the limited variation of the indicator used in the analysis, but the
failure to pick up a well-de￿ned positive wellbeing e⁄ect of EPL is in line with previous
results by Wasmer (2006) and Clark and Postel-Vinay (2009). The former uses panel data
and regional variation in EPL for Canada and ￿nds a positive correlation with job stress,
whose statistical signi￿cance is however lost when regional dummies are included. Using
ECHP data, the latter ￿nds a negative link between a cross-sectional general indicator
27of regulation (an average between EPL and RTE) and job security.
There is statistically more robust evidence that permanent workers￿wellbeing is neg-
atively correlated with restrictions to temporary employment (RTE). These correlations
can be given a causal interpretation if one postulates that constant di⁄erences in legis-
lation are explained by country-￿xed e⁄ects and changes in legislation are explained by
variations in unemployment and demographic characteristics. This result is consistent
with the only clear-cut prediction I gathered from reviewing the theoretical literature.
In fact, restrictions on temporary employment may have a negative e⁄ect on perma-
nent workers￿wellbeing because they reduce (permanent) insider￿ s strength and increase
their exposure to labour market ￿ uctuations. Moreover, stricter regulations mean a more
stagnant labour market and consequently a lower expected value of unemployment.
As for temporary workers, I ￿nd evidence that their job satisfaction decreases when
restrictions on the use of temporary employment increase. The result is statistically
very well de￿ned even when country e⁄ects and a ￿ exible common trends are controlled
for, but statistical signi￿cance is lost when country-speci￿c time trends are included.
Given the limited underlying variation this is hardly surprising and further evidence could
come from longer time periods or studies using within-country variation in legislation.
The negative correlation is found both in Northern and Southern Europe, but statistical
signi￿cance is stronger in the South. Moreover, the results appear to be driven by the
private sector and they are found to hold for the young and women, consistently with the
argument that ￿ exibility bene￿ts these groups. A more stagnant labour market caused
by heavy regulation can explain this result, given that ￿xed-term workers need to ￿nd
another job at the end of their contract. Moreover, stricter restrictions make it harder
for temporary workers to have their contract renewed. However, I ￿nd no evidence of
28a negative relationship between RTE and satisfaction with job security which suggests
that the e⁄ect of RTE unfolds through a di⁄erent channel. Similarly, working conditions
and type of work do not seem to be driving the negative correlation of RTE with job
satisfaction, as I ￿nd no evidence of a negative e⁄ect of RTE when looking at satisfaction
with these items.
A possible explanation is that RTE a⁄ects the extent to which temporary contracts
are voluntarily chosen by workers by limiting the possibility of renewals or the cumulative
duration of contracts. To investigate this hypothesis I have turned to two other datasets
uncovering some evidence in support of an inverse relationship between RTE and volun-
tary temporary employment. First, I have used Eurostat aggregate data on the share
of voluntary temporary employment for a panel of 16 European countries over the years
from 1993 to 2002. I ￿nd that, controlling for EPL, RTE explains the increase in tempo-
rary employment across countries, but not within-countries13. Second, I use microdata
on individuals from 14 EU countries from a 2002 Flash Eurobarometer survey. These
cross-sectional results indicate a negative correlation between RTE and the probability
of being a voluntary temporary employee, after controlling for a wealth of personal and
job characteristics14.
I also ￿nd some weak evidence that protection for permanent workers increases job
13Data were obtained from Eurostat New Cronos (Theme 3), ESDS International, University of
Manchester. Voluntary temporary employment is de￿ned as the share of temporary employees who
"did not want a permanent job". Involuntary temporary employees are those who "could not ￿nd a per-
manent job". Correlation between RTE and the share of (involuntary) voluntary temporary employment
is signi￿cantly (positive) negative, but becomes positive and isigni￿cant when country ￿xed e⁄ects are
included.
14Data from Flash Eurobarometer 120, obtained through the German Social Science Infrastructure Ser-
vice (http://www.gesis.org/en/data_service/eurobarometer/￿ ash/index.htm). Sample size varies from
700 to 1000 depending on the de￿nition of temporary workers. Data from 14 European countries in
2002. Voluntary temporary employees are those reporting to work on a limited-duration contract "on a
voluntary basis". Estimation by probit with standard errors corrected for country-clusters on the sample
of temporary employees. The negative sign on RTE is signi￿cant when estimation is not weighted, but
not when weights for EU-15 are used (note that 14 countries are actually used in the estimation).
29satisfaction for temporary employees, particularly in Southern European countries. When
investigating the reasons for this correlation I ￿nd the same results for satisfaction with
working conditions and satisfaction with security. Following the insider-outsider logic,
the ￿rst result can be explained by positive spillovers from stronger permanent workers
to temporary workers, especially if improvements in working conditions are workplace-
speci￿c rather than job-speci￿c. As for satisfaction with security, the result appears
surprising because temporary workers are not protected by EPL, but it is possible that
temporary workers anticipate the higher protection they will receive once on a permanent
contract.
Finally, in a tentative excercise not reported here, I have augmented the speci￿cation
of the job satisfaction equation by including the estimated probabilities15 of (i) becoming
unemployed and (ii) becoming unemployed and receiving unemployment bene￿ts (UB).
The latter is an attempt to control for another institutional feature which may play a role
similar to that of EPL in insuring the worker against unemployment. Both for permanent
and temporary employees this does not alter the signs of the regulation variables. In
addition, the inclusion of an interaction term between EPL and the estimated probability
of moving into a permanent job provides some indication that temporary workers who
are more likely to switch to a permanent job are positively a⁄ected by EPL. Albeit
statistically weak16, this is consistent with my interpretation of the positive e⁄ect of EPL
on temporary workers￿satisfaction with security as being driven by the anticipation of
likely future protection.
15Due to the lack of credible exclusion restrictions, transition probabilities are estimated using a
multinomial logit model with ECHP data adopting the same speci￿cation as the job satisfaction equa-
tions. Standard errors are not corrected for generated regressors, but the statistical insigni￿cance of
most results makes such correction substantially irrelevant.
16EPL is negative and insigni￿cant, while the interaction term is positive and insigni￿cant. RTE
mantains a negative sign which is signi￿cant at the 1%.
3010 Conclusions
This paper has presented the ￿rst empirical evidence on the wellbeing e⁄ects of ￿ring
costs for permanent workers and restrictions on temporary employment.
I found evidence that private sector permanent employees are negatively a⁄ected
by RTE. The economic theory I have reviewed suggests that RTE reduces permanent
insiders￿strength and increases their exposure to labour market ￿ uctuations.
Temporary workers￿satisfaction is negatively correlated with RTE, particularly for
the young and women. There is no evidence that such e⁄ect comes through job security
or working conditions, while tentative evidence suggests that RTE might reduce the share
of voluntary temporary employment.
Temporary workers￿satisfaction is positively correlated with protection for permanent
workers, especially in the private sector and at least in Southern European countries. Re-
sults on satisfaction with working conditions point to possible positive spillovers from
stronger permanent workers to temporary workers, for example because workplace im-
provements are made. Also satisfaction with security of temporary workers increases
with EPL, suggesting that temporary workers might be anticipating future protection
they will enjoy once on a permanent contract.
Overall, this evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that both permanent and
temporary employees gain in terms of wellbeing from reforms lowering exclusively RTE.
To the extent that wellbeing gains translate into support for a given policy, the results
suggest that temporary employees are likely to be in favor of reforms which do not relax
EPL even if they are not directly protected by it.
Since these results refer to individual workers, one should be careful about drawing
inferences on the e⁄ects of EPL and RTE reforms on aggregate wellbeing. In particular,
31not withstanding the ￿ndings of this paper, reforms making it easier to create temporary
jobs need not lead to an increase in aggregate satisfaction. In fact, since temporary work-
ers generally report lower satisfaction, the increase in the share of temporary employment
generated by such reforms (Kahn, forthcoming) can actually result in a net negative e⁄ect
on aggregate satisfaction. A very simple regression of average job satisfaction (by country
and year) on RTE and EPL shows that the coe¢ cients of the regulation variables change
only very marginally when the share of temporary employment is controlled for. This
preliminary piece of evidence suggests that the indirect e⁄ect of regulations on average
satisfaction through the share of temporary employment is likely to be negligible. An in-
depth analysis of this point certainly requires a more careful consideration of the possible
changes in the demographic composition of permanent and temporary employment caused
by variations in EPL and RTE (Kahn, 2007). In addition, a full assessment of the e⁄ects
of such reforms on aggregate wellbeing should also take into account the unemployed as
their expected utility will be a⁄ected by changes in job creation and destruction as well.
This, of course, requires a measure of wellbeing other than job satisfaction, which is not
available in the dataset used in this paper. Nevertheless, this is certainly an interesting
and promising area for further research.
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Table 1: Random E⁄ests Ordered Probit: Job Satisfaction Equa-
tions for Permanent and Temporary Employees.
Perm Temp Temp
Job Sat Job Sat Sat w/ Security
Variable Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE
Age ￿ .012 ￿ .016** ￿ .084***
(.011) (.007) (.016)
Age2 .000 .000 .001***
(.000) (.000) (.000)
Female .052 .086*** ￿ .102***
(.033) (.023) (.031)
EPL .153* .055 .131
(.092) (.064) (.123)
RTE ￿ .014 ￿ .052*** .023
(.014) (.018) (.042)
Observations 253283 29422 29308
Year and Country Dummies included
Signi￿cance levels:* 10% ** 5% *** 1%
SE adjusted for country clusters
ECHP data, 1995-2001, all employees aged 16-65
34Table 2: Random E⁄ects Ordered Probit:Job Satisfaction Equa-
tions for Permanent Employees.
1 2 3a 4
Job Sat Job Sat Job Sat Job Sat
Age ￿ .040*** ￿ .054*** ￿ .024** ￿ .053***
(.009) (.007) (.012) (.008)
Age2 .001*** .001*** .000 .001***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Child .014 .016 ￿ .005 .015
(.017) (.018) (.010) (.018)
Married .049*** .038*** ￿ .034** .041***
(.012) (.013) (.017) (.013)
Female ￿ .004 .067** .071*** .060**
(.028) (.026) (.023) (.026)
BadHealth ￿ .402*** ￿ .389*** ￿ .288*** ￿ .375***
(.058) (.059) (.043) (.057)
Lnhrs ￿ .104*** ￿ .221*** ￿ .136*** ￿ .218***
(.037) (.048) (.037) (.049)
HigherEdu .047 ￿ .017 .024 ￿ .011
(.055) (.049) (.055) (.052)
SecondEdu .027 .002 .011 .007
(.036) (.036) (.040) (.039)
Supervisor .290*** .245*** .171*** .239***
(.053) (.045) (.040) (.045)
Intermediate .142*** .122*** .079*** .118***
(.034) (.031) (.025) (.031)
Professional .264*** .190*** .140*** .188***
(.046) (.034) (.023) (.037)
Serviceworker .133*** .111*** .091*** .108***
(.028) (.025) (.026) (.026)
PubliSector .184*** .155*** .103*** .156***
(.042) (.035) (.031) (.037)
FullTime .059 ￿ .023 .005 ￿ .011
(.046) (.038) (.037) (.039)
Agriculture .020 .070 ￿ .017 .062
(.058) (.054) (.079) (.051)
Industry ￿ .050*** ￿ .066*** ￿ .085*** ￿ .069***
(.018) (.018) (.019) (.019)
EPL .155 .114 .113 .169
(.101) (.098) (.098) (.119)
RTE ￿ .015 ￿ .021* ￿ .022* ￿ .024*
(.012) (.012) (.011) (.014)




Country E⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year E⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 218765 218765 218765 208942
a: Mudlak speci￿cation in column 3, including means of all individual-level regressors.
Signi￿cance levels:* 10% ** 5% *** 1%
SE adjusted for country clusters. ECHP data, 1995-2001, all employees 16-65.
35Table 3: Random e⁄ects ordered probit estimates for regulations




























Signi￿cance levels:* 10% ** 5% *** 1%
SE adjusted for country clusters
ECHP, 1995-01
36Table 4: Random e⁄ects ordered probit: job satisfaction equations
for temporary employees.
1 2 3a 4 5
Age ￿ .038*** ￿ .055*** ￿ .045 ￿ .053*** ￿ .055***
(.007) (.009) (.028) (.009) (.009)
Age2 .000*** .001*** .000 .001*** .001***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Child .013 .019 ￿ .021 .018 .019
(.019) (.021) (.029) (.022) (.022)
Married .078*** .072*** .035 .074*** .071***
(.016) (.017) (.066) (.018) (.016)
Female .032 .090*** .087*** .078*** .090***
(.029) (.017) (.018) (.023) (.017)
BadHealth ￿ .350*** ￿ .322*** ￿ .224*** ￿ .331*** ￿ .321***
(.064) (.064) (.078) (.066) (.065)
Lnhrs ￿ .029 ￿ .200 ￿ .119 ￿ .196 ￿ .201
(.113) (.127) (.116) (.120) (.127)
HigherEdu ￿ .141*** ￿ .210*** ￿ .060 ￿ .214*** ￿ .211***
(.040) (.040) (.047) (.044) (.040)
SecondEdu ￿ .090* ￿ .117** ￿ .078** ￿ .125** ￿ .118**
(.051) (.052) (.037) (.052) (.052)
Supervisor .355*** .281*** .316*** .292*** .280***
(.069) (.069) (.070) (.072) (.069)
Intermediate .145*** .109*** .069* .121*** .109***
(.033) (.030) (.041) (.026) (.030)
Professional .547*** .459*** .481*** .448*** .460***
(.055) (.049) (.064) (.050) (.049)
Serviceworker .207*** .192*** .254*** .191*** .192***
(.032) (.031) (.033) (.031) (.031)
PubliSector .207*** .185*** .089** .202*** .183***
(.021) (.016) (.042) (.016) (.017)
FullTime .182*** .098*** .055 .114*** .095**
(.052) (.036) (.046) (.030) (.037)
Agriculture ￿ .286** ￿ .259** ￿ .230*** ￿ .227*** ￿ .258**
(.115) (.109) (.064) (.076) (.108)
Industry .018 ￿ .018 ￿ .008 ￿ .016 ￿ .018
(.037) (.031) (.043) (.031) (.031)
EPL .021 .033 .043 .162** .121
(.046) (.044) (.052) (.078) (.081)
RTE ￿ .043*** ￿ .052*** ￿ .055*** ￿ .070*** ￿ .003
(.017) (.016) (.016) (.022) (.039)
Lnincome .381*** .394*** .357*** .382***
(.113) (.134) (.115) (.113)
RegUnempl ￿ .018**
(.008)
Country E⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year E⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Trends No No No No Yes
Observations 25095 25095 25095 24172 25095
a: speci￿cation in column 3 includes means of all individual-level regressors.
Signi￿cance levels:* 10% ** 5% *** 1%
SE adjusted for country clusters.
ECHP data, 1995-2001, all employees 16-65.
37Table 5: Random e⁄ects ordered probit: job satisfaction equations
for temporary employees by macro region.
1 2 3 4
South incl. France North South North incl. France
EPL .114*** ￿ .101 .094* ￿ .093
(.020) (.170) (.050) (.107)
RTE ￿ .038*** ￿ .067*** ￿ .044*** ￿ .046
(.009) (.023) (.008) (.028)
Controls as in column 2 of table 4
Observations 17887 7208 15388 9707
Signi￿cance levels:* 10% ** 5% *** 1%
SE adjusted for country clusters
ECHP data, 1995-2001, all employees aged 16-65
Table 6: Random e⁄ects ordered probit: job satisfaction equations
for temporary employees by age and gender.
Men Women Young Adults
EPL .026 .077 .039 .087
(.059) (.087) (.074) (.088)
RTE ￿ .011 ￿ .090*** ￿ .069*** ￿ .034*
(.025) (.029) (.027) (.020)
Controls as in column 2 of table 4
Observations 13196 11899 12588 12507
Signi￿cance levels:* 10% ** 5% *** 1%
SE adjusted for country clusters
ECHP data, 1995-2001, all employees aged 16-65
38Table 7: Random e⁄ects ordered probit: satisfaction with security
equations for temporary employees.
All All Men Women
Age ￿ .084*** ￿ .079*** ￿ .085*** ￿ .082***
(.015) (.014) (.014) (.018)
Age2 .001*** .001*** .001*** .001***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Child ￿ .053** ￿ .047** ￿ .055** ￿ .049
(.024) (.024) (.023) (.039)
Married .026 .034 .020 .041
(.022) (.023) (.037) (.029)
Female ￿ .057 ￿ .076**
(.037) (.031)
BadHealth ￿ .238*** ￿ .246*** ￿ .275*** ￿ .207**
(.050) (.049) (.073) (.088)
Lnincome .225*** .189*** .243*** .145**
(.064) (.060) (.060) (.069)
Lnhrs .042 .036 .240*** ￿ .147***
(.056) (.057) (.082) (.054)
HigherEdu ￿ .228*** ￿ .246*** ￿ .225*** ￿ .262***
(.062) (.063) (.068) (.074)
SecondEdu ￿ .116** ￿ .128** ￿ .117* ￿ .147***
(.054) (.054) (.069) (.045)
Supervisor .462*** .465*** .467*** .441***
(.103) (.110) (.109) (.156)
Intermediate .157*** .162*** .183*** .132***
(.025) (.026) (.031) (.045)
Professional .179*** .180*** .177** .184***
(.041) (.043) (.083) (.047)
Serviceworker .158*** .156*** .162*** .161***
(.033) (.034) (.035) (.054)
PubliSector ￿ .180*** ￿ .160*** ￿ .142*** ￿ .162***
(.031) (.032) (.046) (.037)
FullTime ￿ .075 ￿ .046 ￿ .080 .048
(.069) (.072) (.099) (.083)
Agriculture ￿ .199*** ￿ .142*** ￿ .163** ￿ .101
(.062) (.039) (.072) (.087)
Industry ￿ .090*** ￿ .093*** ￿ .097** ￿ .086**
(.033) (.035) (.038) (.039)
EPL .209 .376*** .339*** .475**
(.128) (.126) (.106) (.195)
RTE .027 ￿ .003 .050 ￿ .050
(.041) (.040) (.038) (.048)
RegUnempl ￿ .025*** ￿ .029*** ￿ .019*
(.010) (.008) (.011)
Country E⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year E⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25018 24097 12711 11386
Signi￿cance levels:* 10% ** 5% *** 1%
SE adjusted for country clusters
ECHP data, 1995-2001, all employees aged 16-65
39Table 8: Random e⁄ects ordered probit: satisfaction equations for
temporary employees.
1 2
Conditions Type of Work
EPL .234*** .139*
(.066) (.081)
RTE .002 ￿ .002
(.019) (.016)
Controls as in column 2 of table 4
Observations 24186 25100
Signi￿cance levels:* 10% ** 5% *** 1%
SE adjusted for country clusters
ECHP data, 1995-2001, all employees aged 16-65
Table 9: Random e⁄ects ordered probit estimates for regulations
in the private and public sector. Job satisfaction equations for
temporary employees.
Job Satisfaction Security Sat
1 2 3 4
EPLPub .012 .143* .188 .348**
(.048) (.077) (.141) (.137)
EPLPriv .031 .160* .211* .381***
(.049) (.082) (.126) (.123)
RTEPubl ￿ .021 ￿ .038 .047 .019
(.016) (.025) (.048) (.046)
RTEPriv ￿ .068*** ￿ .086*** .017 ￿ .014
(.020) (.023) (.041) (.038)
RegUnempl ￿ .019** ￿ .026***
(.008) (.010)
Controls as in column 2 of table 4
Observations 25095 24172 25018 24097
Joint Wald Test
Chi2 7.85 7.70 1.74 2.30
Restr. 2 2 2 2
P-value .020 .021 .420 .316
Wald Test on EPL
Chi2 1.10 .78 .42 .90
Restr. 1 1 1 1
P-value .294 .377 .517 .342
Wald Test on RTE
Chi2 7.45 7.58 1.42 1.50
Restr. 1 1 1 1
P-value .006 .006 .233 .221
Signi￿cance levels:* 10% ** 5% *** 1%
SE adjusted for country clusters
ECHP data, 1995-2001, all employees aged 16-65
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